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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No,

DAVID R. WARDEN,
Respondent.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether there is conflict adequate for Supreme

Court review when the Court of Appeals in the present criminal
case reversed a jury verdict for insufficiency of evidence on
grounds that the evidence was sufficiently inconclusive, viewed
in a light most favorable to the verdict, such that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted?
2.

Whether the Court of Appeals' application of this

standard of review presents an important and unsettled question
of law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court?
3.

Whether this Court should

review the Court of

Appeals1 jury verdict reversal when the State failed to present
at

trial

any

evidence

to

establish

Dr. Wardenfs

degree

of

deviation from the applicable standard of care as is necessary to
prove criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt?
OPINION BELOW
The

opinion

of

the

Court

Warden, , 122 Utah Adv. Rep, 42,

of

Appeals

P.2d

in

State v.

(Ct. App. 1989),

appears as Appendix A to this brief.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals by a writ of certiorari under UTAH CODE ANN.
78-2-2(5) (Supp.1986).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

UTAH CODE ANN. Section 76-2-103(4)
Definition of "criminal
criminally negligent."

negligence

or

A person engages in conduct:
*

*

*

(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he ought
to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable
risk
that
the
circumstances exist or the result will
occur.
The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to
perceive
it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that
an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the
actorf s standpoint.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David R. Warden, was charged with Negligent
Homicide, a class A misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-206
(1973).

The defendant was initially tried by jury in the Second

Circuit Court, Layton Department, beginning on November 16, 1987;
however, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18, 1987 due
to improper testimony given by one of the State's witnesses.

A

second jury trial was held beginning February 22, 1988, which
continued through February 26, 1988.

Defendant was convicted of

the offense of Negligent Homicide as charged.
The case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals and on
November 22, 1989, the Court ruled by written opinion that the
conviction should be reversed because of insufficiency of the
evidence,

based

upon

the

State's

failure

to

establish

a

"substantial and unjustifiable risk of death."
Defendant
University

of

internship

was

is a physician having graduated

Pennsylvania
at

Madigan

Medical

School

General

in

Hospital,

Washington (T. Vol. IV, page 40, lines 8 - 20).

from the

1964.
fort

His
Lewis,

After four years

in the military service, he settled in Kaysville, Davis County,
Utah, to practice family medicine where he has been ever since
(Id. at page 43, lines 12 - 20).
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He was Board certified in

family medicine in 1970 and has been until the present time (Id,
at page 43, lines 22 - 25 and page 44, lines 1 - 13).
During his practice, Defendant attended approximately
2500 deliveries, 300 of which were home deliveries (Id. at page
45, lines 9 - 25).

A home delivery patient must be low risk,

hospital facilities should be near in case of emergency and there
must

be

family

support

for

the

mother

and

child

following

delivery (Id. at page 48, lines 1 - 25; page 49, lines 1 - 2 3 ;
page 240, line 6; page 242, line 11).
The mother of the deceased child is Joanne Young.
lived

She

in Kaysville, Utah, with her parents, Maurice and Ivy

Young, who are from England having arrived in the United States
in 1985

(T. Vol. I at page 42, line 19 - page 44, line 7 ) .

Maurice and Ivy are the parents of seven children (Joanne being
number 5) all of whom were born in England.

Four were home

deliveries (Id. at page 44, line 24 - page 45, line 3 ) .
Joanne became pregnant out-of-wedlock in early 1986.
She thought conception had occurred in March (T. Vol. Ill, page
40. lines 10 - 15).
Thereafter, Joanne

and

She told her parents in early summer.
Ivy went to see Dr. Mark Bitner who

specializes in obstetrics and was officed at the Tanner Clinic in
Layton, Utah (Id. at page 40, line 10 - page 42, line 18).

4

They visited Dr. Bitner twice - once on June 27 and
again August 8, 1986 (T. Vol. II, page 173, line 24 - page 174,
line 4 and page 176, lines 15 - 18). A complete OB exam was not
performed on the first visit because there was a question about
payment (Id. at page 174, lines 23 - 25 and page 218, lines 1922) because Maurice did not have medical insurance coverage for
his daughter

(Id. at page 148, line 14 - page 150, line 8 ) .

Nevertheless, Joanne and Ivy returned for the second visit at
which time a complete OB exam was done.

Her pregnancy was

determined to be normal (low risk) (Id. at page 226, lines 16page 228, line 16; T. Vol. Ill, page 202, lines 2 - 4

and T. Vol.

IV, page 243, line 13 - page 246, line 2) and the date of
delivery determined to be in early December, 1986.

However, Dr.

Bitner recommended an ultrasound to confirm that finding because
he was uncertain (T. Vol II at page 219, line 12 - page 220, line
12) .

Joanne never returned for the test.

She and her family

were concerned about the cost of a hospital delivery (T. Vol III,
page 101, line 1 - page 104, line 3; T. Vol. II, page 149, line
21 - page 150, line 8 and Id. at page 341, line 7 - page 342,
line 5 ) .
Joanne and Ivy decided on a home delivery and asked
Defendant to attend (T. Vol III, page 49, lines 4 - 15). They
visited him September 8, 1986 (Id. at page 50, lines 15 - 20).
5

Defendant examined Joanne and assessed her for home delivery.

He

found her to be a suitable candidate and agreed to attend the
birth of the child (T. Vol. IV, page 51, line 21 - page 59, line
19) .

Defendant

confirmed

the date of delivery

to be early

December, 1986 fid, at page 57, line 3 - page 58, line 9 ) . He
saw her again October 6, 1986.

The exam did not change his prior

assessment (Id. at page 60, line 9 - page 63, line 12).
On the morning of November 7, 1986, Defendant was at
the University
School

Football

of Utah Football Stadium with the Davis High
Team

as its team physician where they were

participating in the State Tournament.

He was contacted by Ivy

through his remote telephone and advised that Joanne had awakened
with some vaginal bleeding evidenced by spotting

(T. Vol. IV,

page 67, line 7 - page 69, line 22; T. Vol. Ill, page 107, line 4
- page 106, line 18). Both Ivy and Defendant were concerned that
labor was beginning early.

Defendant advised Ivy to keep Joanne

down and call him about 1:00 p.m. or sooner if the situation
worsened (T. Vol. II, page 20, line 7 - 23; Vol. IV, page 69,
line 7 0 page 71, line 5).
Ivy called again about mid-day and advised Defendant
that the bleeding had stopped and that John Shaw, the father of
the child, had said conception may have occurred a month earlier
which would make Joanne full term (T. Vol. IV, page 71, line 76

page 73, line 19; Vol. Ill at page 108, line 19 - page 110, line
20; Vol. II, at page 20, line 20 - page 22, line 21 and Id. at
page 339, line 4 - page 340, line 3).

Defendant advised Ivy to

call again around 5:00 p.m. if Joanne appeared to be continuing
with labor (T. Vol. IV, page 73, lines 3 - 19).
Ivy called late afternoon and advised Defendant that
Joanne was having occasional contractions.

He instructed her to

call when the contractions were three to five minutes apart (T.
Vol. IV, at page 74, line 24 - page 75, line 25; T. Vol. I, at
page 65, line 17 - page 66, line 23 and Vol II, page 25, line 7line 23).
Ivy called

Defendant at home about

10:15 p.m. and

advised that Joanne was in the last stages of labor.

Defendant

arrived at the Young residence at 10:30 p.m. (T. Vol. I, page 67,
line 2 - page 68, line 18).
Upon arrival, he met Maurice at the door, went into the
bedroom, examined Joanne, found that delivery was imminent and
delivered a male infant at 10:40 p.m.
breach position
difficulty.
the

amniotic

The child presented in a

and was delivered within

one minute without

There was no evidence of untoward bleeding nor was
fluid

tinged

with

blood.

The

child

breathed

spontaneously without stimulation, had a normal heart rate and
Defendant assessed the infant as having a one minute and five
7

minute APGAR score of 8 which indicated that the child had good
potential for sustaining life (T. Vol. IV, page 77, line 17page 86, line 5).
The child was small.
being between 4 - 5

pounds.

Defendant estimated his weight as
Defendant thought it was premature

(T. Vol. IV, page 86, lines 8 - 18).
Following birth, the child exhibited some symptoms of
grunting respirations which could be controlled by positioning
the child.
was

Defendant advised Ivy that perhaps hospitalization

indicated.

Defendant

She

thereupon

expressed

showed

concern

Joanne

how

about
to

the

nurse

expense.

the

child,

instructed her on how to keep the child warm and told Ivy that
she

must

watch

the

child

during

the

night

regarding

his

temperature, color and respiration and if they worsened to call
him.

Ivy acknowledged the instructions and Defendant left the

home at about 11:30 p.m.

(Id. at page 96, line 13, through page

105, line 4; Vol. 1, page 85, lines 15 - 18; Vol. Ill, page 122,
line 12 - page 130, line 11).
Defendant did not hear from the family until the next
day about noon when he called the home and was advised the child
had died.

(Id. at page III, line 7 - page 113, line 5 ) .
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and the child into

another bedroom where it was warmer.
8

On two occasions, she

observed that the child's hands and feet were "very blue" which
concerned her.
held him.

About 5:00 a.m. they got the child up and Joanne

He still appeared blue.

They wrapped him in a quilt.

At 8:00 a.m., the child appeared to have stopped breathing.
observed the condition and resuscitated him.
Joanne to be aware of the situation.

Ivy

She did not want

Ivy worked with the child

for approximately 20 minutes (T. Vol. I, page 86, line 17 - page
97, line 24; Vol. II, page 44, line 14 - page 68, line 11; Vol.
Ill, page 136, line 7 - 12).
Ivy called Iris Auger, a friend and neighbor, at about
8:30 a.m. and told her of the birth and that the child was small.
Iris recommended that the child be hospitalized.
were trying to get the doctor.

Ivy said they

Ivy did not disclose to Iris that

the child had appeared to have stopped breathing minutes earlier
nor that there was an emergency (T. Vol. V, page 75, line 15page 83, line 3; Vol. V, page 87, line 19 - page 88, line 2).
Ivy called Defendant's office between 8:30
a.m. but he was not in.

She did not identify herself or report

any emergency concerning the child.
home but he was not there.
or report an emergency.

and 9:00

She also called Defendant's

Again, she did not identify herself

(T. Vol. I, page 95, line 20 - page 97,

line 23; Vol. II, page 69, line 6 - page 72, line 5; Vol. V, page
23, line 6 - page 26, line 11).
9

During the night and morning hours Ivy did not contact
Defendant, did not call the paramedics and did not take the child
to

the

hospital

notwithstanding

the

child's

deteriorating

condition (T. Vol. II, page 75, line 14 - page 77, line 11).
Rather, she called her Bishop in the LDS Church but did not
advise him of an emergency.

The Bishop contacted Frank Kramer,

M.D., a pediatrician who went to the Young home (T. Vol. V, page
38, line 2 - page 45, line 3; Vol. II, page 260, line 21 - page
261, line 25) .
The Bishop and Dr. Kramer arrived about 10:30 a.m.
child appeared lifeless.

The

He was rushed to Humana North Davis

Hospital where he was pronounced dead at approximately 11:15 a.m.
(T. Vol. II, page 283, lines 20 - 23; Id. at page 262, line 1page 268, line 9).
A post-mortem examination indicated the child died of
respiratory distress syndrome (R. at page 69 - 71).
Defendant was available by telephone during the night
of November 7th and the morning hours of November 8th.
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE ARE NO "SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT" REASONS FOR THIS
COURT TO REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS1 CAREFULLY
REASONED DECISION.
It is clear that this Court has the discretion to

review the Court of Appeal's decision in this case.
10

However,

important

interests

of

justice

and

judicial

against meaningless and repetitive review.

economy

caution

This Court's Rule

suggests that the Court grant petitions for certiorari only when
there are "special and important reasons therefor." Rule 43, R.
Utah S. Ct.

Since there are no such reasons present in this

case, the Court should deny the State's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
A.

The Court of Appeals1 insufficiency of evidence
standard of review is identical to the standard
used by this Court and other Court of Appeals
panels.

The State argues that review is appropriate in this
case because there is conflict between the way this Panel applied
the standard of review for insufficiency of evidence and the way
it is applied by this Court and other Panels.

However, an

objective review of the Court of Appeals' decision shows that
there is in fact no conflict.

The State reaches its conclusion

because of its misunderstanding of the standard of review as
applied in the Court of Appeal's decision.
The parties agree on the appropriate standard of review
for

criminal

evidence.

jury

verdicts

on

appeal

for

insufficiency

of

The well-established standard was recently restated by

this Court in State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988).

There,

Justice Howe, writing the opinion of the Court on this point
stated:
11

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and reverse for
insufficient
evidence
'only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the
defendant
committed the crime of which he was
convicted.'
Id. at 593
1983)).

(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P. 2d 443, 444 (Utah

This is the same standard that one Panel of the Court of

Appeals applied in State v. Tolman, 775 P. 2d 422, 424 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1989) , and was expressly acknowledged by the Panel in the
present case to be the controlling standard.

State v. Warden,

122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 (Ct. App. 1990).
This standard obviously requires a reviewing court to
do two important things.

First, it must construe the evidence in

a light most favorable to the verdict.
does not stop here.

However, the analysis

The mere fact that some evidence supports

the verdict is not enough.

If it were, it would be the same as

the standard of review for sufficiency of evidence in a civil
case.

The second important thing the court must do is examine

that evidence to see if it was so inconclusive that a reasonable
person could not have found that it proved the elements of the
crime beyond reasonable doubt.
This is exactly the procedure the Court of Appeals
followed in this case.

The specific task faced by the court was
12

to determine if the State's evidence was so insufficient that a
reasonable person must have had a reasonable doubt about whether
Dr. Warden's conduct was a "gross deviation from the standard of
care."

UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-103(4) (1953).

The court's opinion

shows that it expressly approached its task by viewing the facts
favorable to the verdict.

Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44.

then carefully summarized the evidence in that fashion.
42-43.

It

Id. at

The court thereupon concluded that "even looking at the

evidence

in

evidence

was

the

light

most

'sufficiently

elements of the crime,

favorable

to

inconclusive'

the verdict, that
to

establish"

the

id. at 45.

The State, on the other hand, argues that the court
based its decision on conflicting evidence that was favorable to
Dr. Warden.

To arrive at this conclusion, the State ignores the

court's adoption of the correct standard of review and argues,
that it engaged in sleight of hand, professing one standard but
relying on another, as if the court had some hidden agenda.

To

bolster its contention, the State parrots the dissent in Warden
and provides a list of evidence that it claims is favorable to
the verdict which allegedly contradicts the evidence on which
the court based its decision.

Then, it composes another list of

inferences it believes can be drawn from the evidence.

13

This

demonstrates,

the

State

argues,

that

the

Court

of

Appeals

misapplied the standard of review for insufficiency of evidence.
What causes the State to misinterpret the Court of
Appeals1 decision, is that the mere existence of a quantum of
evidence

that

supports

the

verdict,

dispositive in a criminal case.
evidence

however

large,

is

not

The real issue is whether that

is of a sufficient nature to preclude a reasonable

person

from

defendant's

entertaining
guilt.

reasonable

Consequently,

doubt

this

Court

concerning
should

the

not

be

persuaded that the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of
review simply because the State formulates favorable inferences
drawn

from alleged contradictions between the record and the

Court of Appeals' opinion.
There are other reasons why the Court should not be
convinced by the State's argument.

First, any scrupulous review

of a five-day trial transcript would be certain to reveal minor
differences in an appellate court's brief summary of the facts.
If this were a compelling ground for review, this Court would
arguably

have

to

review

every

lower

court

respectfully, rehear many of its own decisions.

decision

and,

Second, the

State has not indicated whether, or how any of these contradictions

and

inferences,

even

make

a

difference;

simply

demonstrating their existence does not indicate that the Court of
14

Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to
prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Third, this Court

should respect the Court of Appeals1 conscientious and correct
application of the proper standard of review, especially when it
involves

the

examination

of

an

extensive

trial

transcript.

Fourth, the facts in the Court of Appeals1 recitation appear
chosen simply to demonstrate the court's conclusion that the
evidence was insufficient to prove the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, even when viewed favorably to the verdict.

There is no

reason for this Court to subscribe to the State's second-guessing
of why the Court of Appeals included in its opinion the facts
that it did, especially when it openly followed the undisputed
standard of review.
In summary, the Court of Appeals did not reverse the
jury verdict merely because there was conflicting evidence but
because that evidence was not of a sufficient nature to preclude
reasonable doubt.
of

alleged

The mere fact that the State claims a quantity

contradictions

and

inferences

does

not

pose

a

persuasive argument that the Court of Appeals misapplied the
standard of review.
B.

This case does not involve an important or
unsettled question of law that should be heard by
the Supreme Court,

15

As discussed above, the parties to this case agree on
the controlling

standard

of review.

This standard

is well-

settled in Utah, as evidenced by the numerous cases expressing
language identical to that used by the Court of Appeals below.
See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 729 P. 2d 610 (Utah 1986); State v.
Sparks, 672 P.2d 92 (Utah 1983); State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777
(Utah 1977).

Furthermore, the present case does not present any

novel variation
standard.

or

important

questions with

respect to that

Instead, this case revolves around the mechanical

question of whether the standard was properly applied by the
Court of Appeals.

Nothing of value in the development of the law

on important and pressing questions will result from further
review by the Court of this case.
further

review

familiar

standard.

resources.
II.

would

be
This

another
is

not

The only achievement of

repetition
a

proper

of

the

already

use

of

judicial

The Court should deny the State's petition.

THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL IS INCONCLUSIVE TO SHOW
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DR. WARDENfS CONDUCT
GROSSLY DEVIATED FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE.
Even if the Court chooses to disregard the considera-

tions outlined above, the Court should decide that the case on
its merits does not require further review and deny the State's
petition.

16

Dr. Warden was charged with criminal negligence.

To

convict him, the State had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
he should have been aware of a "substantial and unjustifiable
risk" of Jareth Young's death.

The State could not meet its

burden merely by showing that Dr. Warden should have been aware
of a risk but, rather, had to show that the risk was "of such a
nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care."

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-

103(4) (1953) (emphasis added).
Obviously, expert testimony was required to establish
the degree and nature of the risk.
at 43-44.

Gross deviation

Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42

from the standard

of care would

necessarily have to be proven by comparing Dr. Warden's actions
taken in this home delivery context with the actions of other
home delivery practitioners.

In the first place, the State did

not produce any home delivery practitioners as witnesses.

In the

second place, the Statefs witnesses produced no testimony as to
the

degree

of

Dr.

standard of care.

Warden's

deviation

from

the

applicable

Instead, these witnesses, who were adamantly

opposed to home delivery, only offered their belief that Dr.
Warden's conduct was outside the standard of care.

Without proof

of the degree of deviation, assuming that the standard of care

17

proposed by the State is applicable, the State has proven only
civil and not criminal negligence.
By contrast, however, expert testimony for Dr. Warden
showed

that his actions were consistent with

standard of care.

the

applicable

Dr. Gregory White, a respected home delivery

practitioner who had delivered approximately 1,000 babies at home
over

forty years, testified

appropriately.

repeatedly that Dr. Warden acted

For example, he testified that under these facts

a home delivery would have been appropriate (T. Vol. IV, p. 246);
that not doing an ultrasound was acceptable (Xd. at 250) ; that
hospitalization was not indicated upon the mother's "spotting"
(Id. at 254) ; that a physical examination was not indicated after
the mother's cramping and spotting ceased or when she experienced
15

minute

contractions

(Id.

at

257-59);

that

Dr.

Warden's

examination of the newborn was adequate and appropriate (Id. at
2 66-2 69) ; that the examination and prematurity of the baby did
not indicate immediate hospitalization
infant's

grunting

did

not

demand

(Id. at 271) ; that the

immediate

hospitalization,

especially when relieved by a change of position (Xd. at 274-75);
and that it would be appropriate to leave the child in the care
of its mother and grandmother with instructions to call him upon
a change of condition

(Xd. at 277) .

18

In short, none of Dr.

Warden's actions deviated from the standard of care applicable to
a home delivery practitioner.
The Court of Appeals appears to have agreed that the
evidence put on by the State was sufficiently inconclusive that a
reasonable juror must have had a reasonable doubt whether Dr.
Warden's conduct grossly deviated from the applicable standard of
care.

That was why the verdict was reversed and not just because

there was conflicting evidence.

The court concluded that the

response of the State's witness to a question about the standard
of care
"merely reinforces our conclusion that his
testimony, as well as that of the other
experts for the State, must be construed in
light of the fact that home delivery, though
legal, is not a widespread practice by
doctors in Utah.
The State's experts
testified that the medical community in this
state does not teach or train physicians for
home delivery and generally recommends
against it."
Warden, at 45.
CONCLUSION
There are no compelling reasons for the Court to review
the Court of Appeals' decision.

The case does not present any

novel or important questions of law that have not already been
decided, and there is no dispute or conflict between panels of
the Court of Appeals and this Court on the applicable standard of
review for insufficiency of evidence.
19

Furthermore, the fact remains that without testimony as
to the degree of Dr. Warden's deviation

from the applicable

standard of care, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Dr. Warden was guilty of criminal negligence.
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evaluated her for home delivery, considering
the risks of her pregnancy, the proximity of
hospital fatalities, and the availability of
family supjwrt to care for the infant and
mother after birth. Defendant determined that
Joanne's piegnancy was low risk and that
medical facilities were nearby. He also learned
that Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the
primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy had
given birth at home to four of her seven children. Based on -this evaluation, defendant
decided that Joanne was a suitable candidate
for home delivery and agreed to attend the
'birth. He also made arrangements-to obtain
GStets
111 Utah Adv. Rep. 42
Joanne's medical records from her previous
doctor, and on the basis of that information
IN THE
and his own examination, calculated her delivery date to be in early December.
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
On the morning of November 7, Joanne
STATE of Utah,
began experiencing vaginal bleeding. Ivy called
Plaintiff and Respondent,
defendant, who was in Salt Lake City at the
T,
time. Defendant expressed concern that labor
David R. WARDEN, Jr., MJ>.,
was beginning and advised Ivy to confine
Defendant and Appellant.
Joanne to bed and to contact him immediately
if the bleeding became heavier or if strong
No. W0575-CA
contractions began. That afternoon. Ivy called
FILED: November 22,19*9
defendant again and told him that the Heeding"
had stopped. She also toid him that she had
Second Grant, Layton Department
spoken with the father of the child and that he
Honorable K. Roger Bean
had toid h«r that conception had occurred >
month eartter than originally believed. Deffe*
ATTORNEYS:
ndaxit
testified that this information fed him toDarwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for Appelant
think that the labor was not premature, and
MeMn C. Wilson, and Brian J. Namba,
he advised her to caD again aa labor contir
Farmingtos* for Respondent
iwed. Ivy did so that evening, lcpoitlng that
Joanne was having occasional contractions^
Before Judges Beach* Greenwood, and
Defendant toid her to call back when the
BnOock.1
contractions were three to Ave minutes apart.
At about 10:15 p.m., Ivy informed defendant
OPINION
that the final stage of labor had begun. Defendant arrived at the house fifteen minutes
BENCH, ledge:
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of later.
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech birth
negligent homicide, a dasr A misdemeanor, In
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 to a male infant which appeared to be healthy*
but weighed only an estimated four to five
(1978). We reverse the conviction.
pounds. The baby exhibited some respiratory
FACTS
distress which defendant attributed^ premaDefendant David R/Wardea, Jr., is a acc- turity. Defendant testified that he suggested
used and board-certified physician who hospitalization of the infant to Ivy, but that
began practical* family medicine in Kaysvffie, Ivy was concerned because there was no health
Utah, in. 1968, As part of his practice, defen- insurance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied
dant provides obstetrical cue, and rsrimatas that she O'er discussed with defendant hospithat be* has attended approximately 2500 talization of the infant.) Defendant instructed
births, 300 of which have bees home ddive- Ivy how to position the infant to relieve some
rieti*
of the respiratory distress and.showed Joanne
In September 1986, defendant was visited far how to morse the baby* He also instructed Ivy
his office' by Joanne Young, who consulted tp keep the child warm and to monitor the
defendant because she was pregnant out-of- baby's temperature, cote, and broahing*
wedlodt and wanted to have her baby at After instructing Ivy to caS him if there were
home. Joanne testified that she waa embarra- [ any changes in the baby's condition, defenssed about her pregnancy and 'didn't want to dant left at about 11:30 p.nu
have to go to the hospital and have people
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and the
know/ She also expressed a desire to keep the baby into a wanner room* Ivy noticed that the
expenses of birth to a minimum. Defendant chUd's hands and feet were 'very blue/ but
did not ca.il defendant. At 3:00 a.m.» the baby
case, however, we bdieve the issue of prejudice
relative to the gun custody issue was sufficiently
problematic to mem analysis.
8. For example, defendant claims his counsel should
have argued he was incompetent to stand tnal or
lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent to
commit the crimes. Testimony at defendant's sentenons hearing, however, by Dr. Alma Carlisle, a
Utah State Pnson psychologist, negated those the*
ones. Exclusion of the theories wis, therefore, a
legitimate trial strategy.
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appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy att- (14th ed. 1979). Furthermore, "[t]be nsk must
empted to resuscitate him for about twenty be of such a nature and degree that the failure
minutest, and apparently the infant responded. to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
She then called defendant's office, but was from the standard of care that an ordinary
told he was at home. When Ivy called defen- person would exercise in aH the circumstances
dant's home, his wife advised her he was not as viewed from the actor's standpoint.* Utah
there, but would be in his office by 9:30 a.m. Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1978). ConseqIn neither call did she identify herself, leave a uently, negligent homicide involves a defenmessage, nor report that there was any emer- dant's perception of risk and necessarily reqgency. She apparently was aware defendant uires an evaluation of his or her state of mind.
was not inaccessible in such a situation, but Stale v. Wessendorf, Til P.2d 523, 525-26
did^not make further attempts to reach him. (Utah 0 . App. 1989). Whether a defendant
She did not take the infant to the hospital or negligently fails to perceive the risk is a quesnotify emergency services. She testified that in tion of fact for the jury. See State v. Howard,
England, her native home, 'you would have 597 P.2d 878, 881^Utah 1979). However, the
had to have a. doctor's permission to have risk of death "must be of such a degree that
called an ambulance. "
an ordinary person would not ... fail to recoAt about 8:30 sum.. Ivy called a friend but gnize i t / State v. Dyer, 671 PJd 142, 14*
did not tell her that the cMd was having dif- (Utah 1983).
Because the "failure to perceive the risk
ficulty breathing. She also called her clergyman, but did not advise him until 9:30 or constitutes a gross deviation from the reaso10:00 a.m. that the baby was having respira- nable man standard/ ordinary negligence
tory difficulty. The clergyman called a local adequate in die civil law is insufficient to
pediatrician, who arrived at the Youngs' home constitute criminal negligence. Stare Y*
at about 10:30 ajn. only to find the infant Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 1979); see
'lifeless.* The baby was taken to a hospital, a/so Standiford, 769 PJ2d at 267; 2 CTorcia,
but was pronounced dead shortly after arrivaL Wharton's Criminal Law §168 (terms such aa
A postmortem examination revealed that the "criminal negligence" are intended u> connote
infant was born approximately six to seven deviations from reasonableness significantly
week* premature and had died from respira- greater in degree than ordinary negligence)^
tory distress caused by prematurity of the Thus* "tmlere inattention or mistake in judglungs (hyaline membrane disease). Defendant ment resulting even in death of another i*. no*
subsequently was charged with one count of criminal unless the quality of the act makes it,
s o / People Y. Rodriguez* 186 CaL. App. 2d
negligent homicide.
An initial jury trial ended in a mistrial prior 433,8 CaL Rptr. 863,868 (1960%
to the rendition of a verdict, A second jury
EXPERT TESTIMONY
trial was held February 22-26, 1988, and
Defendant contends that expert testimony
defendant was convicted as charged. Defendant's motions to arrest judgment and for a was required in this case to establish the
"standard of care," but that the State's
new trial were denied.
medical experts were not qualified to testify.
On the other hand, the State argues that
ISSUES
Defendant raises essentially two issues on expert medical testimony was not required^
appeal* arguing, for a reversal of his convic- and that it needed only to present "competent
tion. He first claims that the State's expert evidence to show the nature and degree of risk
witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the and the circumstances as viewed from the
applicable-medical standard of care. Second* actor's standpoint/ The State correctly obshe argues that there was insufficient evidence erves that the "standard of care" in section 76to establish that his conduct deviated signifi- 2-103(4) refers to the actor's mental state; at
cantly from the applicable standard of care opposed to medical malpractice cases in which:
and-that there was a causal connection expert medical testimony is required to show
between hit conduct and the baby's death.
the applicable standard of medical care. Sxt
&*, Chadwkk Y. NWsea, 763 P.2d 817, 821
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). It is also true that
Conduct constituting the crime of negligent expert testimony t$ not required to prove the
homidde occurs when an 'actor, acting with mental state of a criminal defendant accused
criminal negligence, causes the death of of homicide. See State v. Nkhoisoa, 585 PJd
another.' Utah Code Ann* §76-5-206(2) 6 # 63 (Utah 1978).
(1978), The culpable mental state for criminal
We conclude; however, that expert testinegligence require* 'only that a defendant mony was required in this case since such
'ought to be aware of a substantial and unj- testimony was necessary to establish the nature
ustifiable risk' of death.' State v. Standiford, and degree of risk. Section 76-5-206(1)
769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah requires the State to prove beyond a- reasonCode Ami, §76.2-103(4) (1978)); see *lso 2 able doubt that defendant's judgment was
C Toraa, Wharton's Criminal Law §168 criminally deficient because he failed to pcrc*
UTAH ADVANCE 2EPOBXS

44

State T. Warden
Adr. tap. 42

exve a substantial risk that death could occur.
Without an understanding of the nature and
degree of risk, the jury could not determine
whether the risk was substantial, and if so,
whether defendant's failure to perceive it was
grossly negligent. Unless the risk is one within
the common knowledge and experience of
laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury could
make an informed determination of culpability.2 We believe that expert testimony is required where criminal negligence is alleged and
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the
kea of the average layperson. See, e.g.t
Kctchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934
(W.D.N.Y. 1976) (State's, use of expert
medical testimony at trial supplied sufficient
evidence of criminal negligence for negligent
homicide conviction iri death of mother on
whom physician had performed legal abortion).
Defendant argues- that the State's expert
medical witnesses did not qualify as experts
because they do not attend home deliveries.
The witnesses included two obstetrician/
gynecologists, a pediatrician, and a neonatologist* Citing the medical malpractice case of
Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248
(Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school of
medicine is not competent to testify as- an
expert against the practitioner of another
school), defendant argues that the State's
doctors were not qualified to testify because
they were of a different school of medicine
than defendant.
Hie qualification of an expert witness ia a
matter within the sound discretion, of the trial
court. State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421
(Utah 1986). There was evidence in the record
that there is no board certification or recognized medical specialty in home delivery. There
was also evidence that the medical principles
applicable to the delivery of babies are applicable whether a birth occurs at home or in a
hospital. In view of the record evidence, the
trial court was within its discretion to qualify
the State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf.
Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and
procedures of general plastic surgeon were
shown to be identical to those of specialized
plastic surgeon, one may testify against the
other); Wessd v. Erickson Landscaping C&*
711 PJd 250, 253 (Utah 1985) (nothing precludes testimony from expert in another trade if
the standard is the same for, both). 'The critical factor in determining the competency of
an expert is whether that expert has knowledge
that can assist the trier of fact in resolving-the
issues before i t / Id. at 253; see alsoJQtato JL
EvicL 702. We conclude that the trial court
committed no abuse of discretion in allowing
the State's experts to testify.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Defendant claims that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish guilt beyond

CODE*CO
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a reasonable doubt. To convict a person of
violating section 76-5-206(1), the State must
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, both
prohibited conduct and a qulpable mental
state. To establish a culpable mental state, the
prosecution must present evidence that defendant was unaware of a substantia/ and unjustifiabfa risk of death, but should have been
so aware.
We review defendant's claim under a standard that does not permit us to substitute our
judgment for that of the jury in a criminal
trial* See State v. To/man, 775 P.2d 422* 424
(Utah a . App. 19S9). Rather,
we review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
draw from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury.
We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
haw entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.
Stare r. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
1985) (quoting State v. Petrce, 659 P.2d 443,
444 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Hopkins,
119Utalt Adv. Rep. 59,60(1989).
Defendant testified at trial that the grandparents weighed the newborn baby and determined it to be about five pounds.. Defendant
also sakl he believed the baby to be two to
three weeks premature. Defendant was aware
that the baby was having 'grunting respirations,* which he said was a sign of early resp-*
iratory distress syndrome. Defendant positioned the baby in such a way that the labored
breathing was relieved. He further testified
that the severity of the respiratory distress did
not indicate a need for hospitalization. He
said that he informed Ivy that the baby waa.
premature and had difficulty in breathing, but
that the baby was then stable. He instructed
Ivy to call him if there was any change and
admitted that he was depending on- Ivy to
carefully watch the infant. Before leaving the
Young residence, defendant noted that the
respiratory difficulty had subsided He stated*
'The baby was respiring wefl*. the-baby waa
still awake and alert and musde tone waa stiff
good^He also said,
I was ^impressed that the baby had
already shown some signs of resp£
ratory distress syndrome* but under
similar tircumstances in the, past* I
have left babies at home^. having
instructed the mother'on- how-to
nurses having instructed the mother
to- keep the baby warm, and there*
fore I felt I could leave, confident
that grandma would ca&me, conf-
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ident that if there were any progression of symptoms that I would be
called.
Defendant later testified that of 300 home
births he had attended, approximately ten of
those babies had been premature. Eight of
those had had respiratory distress, but defendant said that he had hospitalized only three
of those eight. In the case of this infant, defendant testified that "in my experience and the
judgment that I applied at the time based on
experience with babies who are even smaller
than this delivered at home, they can in many
cases get along very, very well.... *
The State's expert medical witnesses testified that although the mother and baby
"would do better* in a hospital, defendant's
evaluation of the infant's well-being would
indicate that the baby's vital signs were
"acceptable." They conceded that the infant
may have survived had he been hospitalized up
to ten hours after birth, but believed that
leaving the baby at home was "bad judgment"
on defendant's part.3
The State's neonatologist testified that
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive
disease. He also indicated that a baby in the
condition of the deceased is typically "at high
risk for medical and surgical problems*" As
far as mortality for an infant with the disease,,
however, he stated that the failure to provide
therapy would only-place the- probability of
death at five to-fifteen percent. He later stated
upon cross-examination that statistically only
two pqceut of babier d k from untreated
hyaline membrane disease. He further said, 1
guess the message is i f s very unusual and rare
to lose a baby at this gestation and this birth
weight from hyaline membrane disease. •"
Asked whether it would be outside the
medical standard of care to have the family of
a home-delivered newborn to monitor any
change* in the baby's condition, the neonatologist believed' it was, but conceded that
other-competent physicians would disagree
with him- This response merely-reinforces our
conclusion that his testimony, as wefl a* that
of the other experts for the State, must be
construed, in light of the fact that home delivery, though legal, is not a widespread practice by doctors in Utah. The State's experts
testified that the medical community in this
state does not teach or train physicians for
home delivery and generally recommends
against it.
We are convinced that even looking at the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, that evidence was "sufficiently incondusive" to establish that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death such that
defendant should have been aware of it. Thus,
reasonable minds could examine the evidence
presented and entertain *a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of
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which he was convicted." See Booker, 709
P.2dat345.
Since we conclude that the evidence failed to
establish criminal negligence, we need not
reach the issue whether defendant's acts or
omissions were the legal cause of death.
Defendant's conviction is reversed.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
I CONCUR:
J. Robert Bullock, Judge
1. J. Robert BuOodc Senior District Judge, sitting
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).
2» This is distinct from expert testimony- as to the
subjective intent of the defendant, i.e., 'the actor'»
viewpoint,9 which need not be accepted by the court
and which is ultimately a determination for the jury.
3. Our research has revealed very few cases in which
licensed physicians have been charged with negligent
homicide. In many of those cases where such a
charge has been brought, albeit under differing
statutes, the courts have held that no criminal liability attaches when death results from an error of
judgment See generally Annotation* Homicide
Predicated on Improper Treatment of JDtotse or
Zzyury, 45 A X J U d 114(1972).
GREENWOOD, Jidge: (<
dissenting
I concur in Judge Bench's opation "concerning expert testimony, but dissent from the
opinion's conclusion that there was* not sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's-conviction
of negligent homicide. The majority opinion
correctly states the necessary Quantum o f evidence for negligent homicide as being where
the defendant should have bees aware of a
substantial and unjustified risk: of death; but
was not. Stste v. Wcssendorf, 777 P.2d 523,
525 (Utah <X App. 1989), Also, the risk must
be such that an ordinary person- would not,
disregard or fail to recognize it- Slate vrDyer,
671 P.2d 142, 143 (Utah 1983). Therefore, in
this case, the State was required to convince
the jury that there was- a substantial and unjustified risk that the infant^wouid die if he did
not receive medical care in a hospital-type
setting; that defendant was unaware that the
risk existed; and that an ordinary* person in
defendant's position would have recognized
that risk. Our task as an appellate court, is'to
determine if'the evidence presented^ whet*
viewed favorably to the jury verdict *ls sufficiently inconclusive or Inherently improbable
that reasonable minds o u s t halve entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which, he wa* convicted*? State
v." Booker,' 709T P.2d~~342, 1 4 5 (Utah
19S5) (quoting State V. Petiee, 659 P3& 443,
444(1983));
My assessment of the evidence supporting
the jury verdict is as follows: defendant was a
licensed physician who- had maintained a
family practice since 1968, including obstetr-
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icai care; defendant assumed responsibility for
the infant's physical well-being by agreeing
to deliver it at home; defendant did not insist
on examining the mother when she reported
vaginal bleeding to determine if premature
birth was likely or if so, what precautions
should be taken to minimize the likelihood of
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the
infant after birth as having Respiratory Distress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to
position the infant in a way which relieved the
symptoms but would not allev&te the condition itself; defendant minimized the seriousness ef the infant's condition to Ivy and
Joanne; three of the ten children he had delivered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome
were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant
could die from the disease and that the disease
was progressive; defendant could not himself
admit the infant into a hospital because he
lacked malpractice insurance, so would have
to call another physician or have the infant
admitted through an emergency room facility;
Ivy testified that defendant only told her to
watch the infant for changes in his temperature, color and respiration, without advising
her as to the degree of change which might
indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or
Joanne that death could result from the
disease; and defendant left the infant in the
care of laypersons.
There was other, conflicting evidence which
wpuld indicate that dffmdant should not have
been aware that a substantial risk existed.
However, the existence of conflicting evidence,
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury
verdict. Sute v. Tohaum, 775 P.2d 422, 42425 (Utah CL App. 1989). The jury has been
through the arduous task of listening to and
assctting the evidence presented in this most
difficult case, and I do not think that we
should appropriately substitute our judgment
for that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was
based on what defendant knew or the jury
believed he knew at the time, and its assessment that given that knowledge he should
have known the risks. I do not find the evidence 'sufficiently inconclusive,* as do my
colleagues, to justify conviction. I would
conclude that the record, while heatedly controverted, contains sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that defendant should have
been aware that a substantial and unjustified
risk of death existed, and to convict defendant
of negligent homicide as a result.
Pamela T. Greenwood* Judge
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corporation,
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Roland W. REICHERT,
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NO.880246-CA
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Bryce E. Roe, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
and (Zross-Respondent
E.H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent and Cross-Appellant
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and
Greenwood. tpOPINION
BILLINGS, Judge?
Regional Sales. Agency, Inc. ('Regional')
appeals from a jury verdict awarding it
5792.18 in damages as a result- of crossappellant Roland Reichert's ('Mr. Reichert')
breach of a non-competition agreement with
Regional, his former employer. Regional also
appeals the trial court's reduction of its attorney fees which Regional claims were provided
for by the parties' written contract and reasonably incurred in prosecuting this action.
Mr. Reichert cross-appeals the court's
denial of his attempt to amend his counterclaim to add a claim for unpaid commissions
and salary. We reverse and remand in. part*
and affirm in part.
Since the late 1950s, Edward and Helen
Kihoim have operated a small family business
which acted as a manufacturer's representative
inriesisinatrdterritories of the mountain west.
The business earned commissions from iU
principal manufacturers by selling their good*
to retailers.
In 1577* the Kiholms hired Mr. Reichert aa
an independent contractor to handle outside
saks~ If the relationship was satisfactory, the
Kiholms Intended to retire in ten years with
Mr. Reichert taking, over the business. Mr.
Reichert worked for the Kiholms until 1978
when the business was incorporated as Regional.
In 1979, Mr. Reichert entered into a written
employment contract with Regional. The
employment contract contains a nou-
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